"they do not understand the different kinds of artillery or their correct use." 14 Though Herberstein was not aware of it, we know from Muscovite sources that the tactically arrayed cavalry army was arranged in five wings -great, advanced, right, left, guard. 15 About the organization of forces above the tactical level, Herberstein says little. Nonetheless, there are several hints in Rerum moscoviticarum that he understood the all-Muscovite army to be a combination of regional units based in the former appanage courts. For example, he clearly states that Muscovy is made up of principalities and notes that their erstwhile rulers now serve the grand prince in Moscow. 16 This is echoed in indigenous sources that speak of regional courts. 17 That the localities contributed forces to Moscow's army is clear. 18 To give but one example, in a description of the Novgorod campaign of 1477/8 we find Muscovite courtiers leading twenty-four contingents of provincial warriors (suzdal'tsy, iur'evtsy, koluzhany, etc.). 19 Further, Herberstein remarks that the grand princely court registered central and provincial warriors every two to three years. 20 The fact of registration is supported if not confirmed by scattered indications in indigenous texts where we read of courtiers receiving what may be muster lists upon the acceptance of command assignments. 21 To conclude, the cavalry army of the early sixteenth century was a small, mobile force comprised of central and regional militias, perhaps garrisoned in fortified cities, and mustered on the occasion of great campaigns. There was no centralized, permanent force outside the grand prince's court. 22 14 Ibid. New Light on the Early History of Russian Bureaucracy" (unpublished ms.) I hope to publish this article in the near future. 16 Ibid., 93: "What follows is a description of the country (Landbeschreibung), of the principalities and lordships (Herrschaften) of the grand prince . . ."
17 On the continued existence of regional courts in Muscovy after 1500, see A. A. Zimin, "O sostave dvortsovykh uchrezhdenii Russkogo gosudarstva kontsa XV-XVI v.," Istoricheskie zapiski 68 (1958) : 180-205 and idem, "Udel'nye kniaz'ia i ikh dvory vo vtoroi polovine XV i pervoi polovine XVI v.," in Istoriia i genealogiia (Moscow, 1977) . 18 For an overview, see G. Let us now turn to the fiscal system that supported the cavalry army circa 1600. Here again Herberstein is our best source, because (tellingly) almost no administrative paper related to funding the army survives prior to the second half of the sixteenth century. 23 Regarding remuneration for service, he writes:
And whomever he calls to court, or sends to war, or dispatches on an embassy, must pay their own way, except for the deti boiarskie, that is the impoverished nobles. They are so poor that he [the grand prince] takes their sons annually [to Moscow] and maintains them on meager stipends. Thus if he assigns a stipend of six guldens to one of them for three years, he [the servitor] pays this stipend himself in the third year. However those who receive twelve guldens annually as a stipend must be ready with their horses at all times for any purpose, and indeed at their own cost. The elites, those who are sent on embassies and other great affairs, do not receive much money, but instead
[receive] offices, villages, or other definite and notable incomes, usually for a period of eighteen months. And if a special favor or pretext is rendered, then this period can be extended several months, but in such a way as not to lessen the tribute and ordinary incomes of the prince. The fines and duties which are extracted from the poor may be kept by them. Those whose tenure is over have no hope of receiving similar favor for six years, but must in the meantime fulfill all services and commands at their own expense. 24 The fiscal system Herberstein describes was composed of two tiers. Wealthy warriors served without remuneration. If they were charged with special duties, they received prebends. Provincial servitors received small, irregular stipends. It is clear that the court was not involved in financing the bulk of the army: the boyars (boiare) and provincial gentry (dvoriane and deti boiarskie) covered the cost of campaigning by extracting goods and funds from their estates. This is perhaps why the military audits described by Herberstein took account of the number of bondsmen a servitor had -this would have been a good indicator of his resources.
The military-fiscal format we find outlined in Herberstein was well-suited to the needs of Ivan III's time. The Muscovites fought Tatars, Cossacks, Lithuanians, and Livonians -all of whom were wedded to the cavalry arm. The Russians followed suit, relying almost entirely on horsemen for their defensive needs. However in the second half of the sixteenth century the Russians encountered Western-style forces with increasing frequency, particularly in the costly Livonian War. In response the court elite began to alter the composition of its forces in the 1550s. Though the surviving sources do not permit a detailed reconstruction of the course of the reform, its outline is reasonably clear. 25 First, the court re-figured the army itself. The regime attempted to enhance its control over command positions by placing limits on the precedence disputes (mestnichestvo) that sometimes interfered with military activity. 26 Further, steps were taken to 23 The earliest such sources appear in the 1550s. See 29 More significantly, the regime began to restructure the system of remuneration for all personnel. The government made efforts to centralize its income under a plan to commute provender rents (kormlenie) into cash. 30 These funds were collected by agents, deposited in central institutions 31 , and then used to pay servitors' salaries (oklady) according to fixed compensation scales. 32 The traditional system of knightservice from estates was also revamped. Prior to the 1550s martial aid from non-prebendal estates (votchiny) was in theory voluntary and the amount of service one had to render from prebendal estates (pomest'ia) was unregulated (at least in writing). The reforms of the 1550s stipulated that all landholders had to offer military aid to the grand prince. The court issued schedules relating landholdings to service obligations. 33 In short, the government of Ivan IV made the first significant attempt to modernize the Russian army and the fiscal administration that supported it. Traces of the new system are documented in indigenous sources, though it is never synoptically described. Fortunately, the English ambassador Giles Fletcher provided an excellent general discription of When warres are towards (which they fayle not of lightly every yeere with the Tatar, and manie times with the Polonian and Sweden) the foure Lordes of the Chetfirds sende foorth their summones in the Emperours name, to all the Dukes and Dyacks of the Provinces, to bee proclaymed in the head Townes of every Shire that all Sinaboiarskey, or sonnes of gentlemen make their repaire to such a border where the service is to be done, at such a place, and by such a day, and there present them selues to such, and such Captaines. First, the practice of enticing cavalrymen into the new units with cash was gradually abandoned. To fill the ranks of the gunpowder army, the government began to draft soldiers out of peasant and tax-paying communities. Recruitment quotas were enacted for villages. Second, the government began to force cavalrymen into the new units. Those without sufficient means to serve in the old army were placed in the new units, as were the sons of all cavalrymen. Finally, the strel'tsy were removed from field duty and made into a sort of constabulary/garrison force. 39
Naturally, the creation of this new army was accompanied by changes in taxation and administration. Direct imposts became more burdensome, at least in part due to the cost of the new forces. 40 In the 1680s the government began to impose household taxes in place of the old land unit tax (sokha). Indirect taxes also rose, and the government made some effort to rationalize their collection. In 1680 the entire tax system was centralized in the hands of the treasury. In conclusion, we see a succession of three military-fiscal formats in Muscovy from the time of Ivan III to Peter I.
The following table makes this clear. 42 On all these, see Brown, "Muscovite Government Bureaus," 269-330.
In the era of Ivan III, the army was a small cavalry force, uncompensated outside prebends, status, and booty. The reign of Ivan IV brought significant reforms and a new format. Gunpowder units were created and the government began to centralize control of tax incomes and service land stocks. In the second half of the seventeenth century, a third format was introduced. The older units -cold-armed cavalry and strel'tsy -were gradually supplanted by new-model infantry.
The bulk of these units was drafted from the tax-bearing population and outfitted by the state.
The Progress of Literate Administration
The Muscovite cavalry host required almost nothing in the way of military administration or documentation prior to 1475. Given its small size and ad hoc character, the army's administrative requirements could be and probably were accomplished orally. Though the surviving sources are in many ways incomplete, what we do not find is nonetheless telling. The record contains no evidence of a centralized administration charged with the maintenance of the army.
There was a court scriptorium, but it was small and almost completely undifferentiated. 43 In light of the fact that there was no army administration, it is not surprising that we find no military documentation. 47 It is reasonably easy to explain why these types of paper evolved. By international convention, diplomacy was conducted in writing. The Muscovites followed suit, though somewhat later than their competitors. 48 Land registers first appear in connection with the annexation of Novgorod.
The surviving land books -as well as later references to cadastres which do not survive -make clear that the grand prince supported the army in part through the distribution of prebendal estates and direct taxation. 49 Judging by the surviving documentary record neither measure was thorough-going. 50 Most cavalrymen continued to serve from their allodial estates, outside the sphere of central control and documentation. Some servitors received prebends of various sorts and we find texts associated with their distribution. These documents regulated the collection of provender rents and attest to the decentralized nature of the fiscal system. 51 The service books were a response to the need to regulate conflict among court clans. As servitors entered the Muscovite court from appanage and extra-Rurikid lands, competition for status grew more intense. For this reason, the regime of Ivan III began to record both service histories (in the deployment books (razriadnye knigi)) and lineage (in the genealogical books (rodoslovnye knigi)). The government used these texts to calculate relative status, make service assignments, and resolve precedence disputes (mestnichestvo). 52
Finally, behind the deployment books lie a set of administrative documents -especially muster lists -that do not come down to us. 53 These personnel records probably represent a first response to the increasing administrative burden brought on by the enlargement of the empire and its army. 54
The tentative movement toward literate administration we see in the last quarter of the fifteenth century was accelerated by the military reforms of the 1550s. Two provisions of the military re-figuration were particularly significant.
The first was the commutation and redirection of provender rents. The government stipulated that in-kind payments to local officials be converted into cash and transferred directly to Moscow. The result was the partial centralization of finance. Each chancellery was assigned territories from which it was to pay for operations 55 53 See Poe, "Muscovite Personnel Records," passim. 54 The army probably grew in the era of Ivan III, but efforts to trace its growth or even estimate its size at any given point in time are frustrated by a lack of relevant documentation. See accounts. 56 Special financial bureaus were created, for example the Tax Collection Chancelleries (cheti), which funded the cavalry army, and the Chancellery of the Grand Revenue (prikaz bolshogo prikhoda), which supplied the strel'tsy. 57 In short, after the reform the court became paymaster for the army and books were kept accordingly. Yet recording what was distributed in land and cash was only half of the equation. The government had to see that it received what it paid for in terms of military service. This meant regular verification that servitors were fulfilling their obligations and that they were being properly compensated. Consequently the court instituted a system of military reviews and began to keep regular personnel registers. 58 Fletcher renders a thumbnail sketch of these practices: "When they come to the [muster] place assigned them in the summons or proclaimation, their names are taken by certaine Officers that have Commission for that pourpose from the Roserade, or high Constable, as Clarkes of the Bandes." 59 Actually much more was done: officials verified land and peasant stocks, apportioned entitlements, checked horses and armaments. All of this was recorded in neatly arranged lists and archived in Moscow. 60 The second reform causing an increase in government record-keeping was the imposition of a universal requirement on all landholders for service or payment according to wealth. With this the regime was compelled to track the assets of its potential servitors, something not required when service was (in principle) not mandatory. To manage the registration of landholding the court elite founded the massive Service Land Chancellery (pomestnyi prikaz) in the second quarter of the century. 61 Fletcher describes the registration of service lands after the reforms of the 1550s. "When they
[cavalrymen] are of yeeres able to beare armes, they come to the office of the Roserade, or great Constable, and there present themselves: who entreth their names, and allotteth them certaine lands to maintien their charges." 62 An order for disbursement was then issued to the Service Land Chancellery, which, according to Fletcher, "keepeth a Register of all lands given by the Emperour for service to his Noblemen, Gentlemen, and others, giveth out and taketh in all assurances for them." 63 Interestingly, we also see new rigor brought to an old form of documentation -the service books. The government moved both the genealogical and deployment books into the Military Service Chancellery and produced official redactions. 64 More importantly, the court began to keep centralized lists of servitors showing rank, seniority, land and cash entitlements, and place of service. 65 The purpose behind these new lists seems to have been to avoid status conflicts and rationalize record-keeping. Administrators no longer needed to guess the status or entitlement of a particular member of the governing class -this and more could simply be read off lists.
Though the coming of the new-model army and its eventual triumph over the cavalry/strel'tsy format brought changes to the central administration, they cannot compare to those which transpired between 1500 and 1600. The reason is not far to seek. The centralization of military-fiscal administration was the basic force behind bureaucratization and paperization. This fact was not altered by the introduction of any particular mix of forces, so long as they were controlled and paid from Moscow. Thus the new-model army -maintained from the center as had been its predecessor -did not transform the need for administrative resources. It did nevertheless intensify administrative growth and record-keeping. The infantry armies were larger than the combined cavalry/musketeer hosts and this probably increased the administrative burden on the center. 66 Not only did more troops have to be registered, they also had to be supplied with cash and arms. This too represented an increase in the burden on the chancellery system. After the distribution of service lands, the old cavalry was in principle self-supporting: it lived and fought from its estates. This meant the administrative burden of supply was shouldered by landholders. Soldiers, on the other hand, had to be trained and outfitted by Moscow. Tax-payers were catalogued, taxes were collected, central bureaus purchased weapons, supplies and cash were distributed to captains, and the captains in turn gave the arms and cash to soldiers. At each stage in this process administrators intervened and documented activities. there were over 1900. 68 In 1550 there were no central chancelleries; in 1626 there were forty-four; and in 1698 there were fifty-five, each with a more or less distinct territorial or functional sphere of activity. 69 Attention to literate regulation of affairs likewise expanded, as we can see by comparing successive law codes. The Sudebnik of 1497 contains sixty-eight articles; that of 1550, 100 articles; that of 1589, 231 articles (extended redaction); finally, the Sobornoe Ulozhenie contains almost 1000 articles divided into twenty-five thematic chapters. 70 As the law grows, so does the complex of paperwork that must be used to administer it. The government conducted land surveys with renewed vigor, particularly now that it had to raise and support the army itself. We find major land/asset registry campaigns in the 1620s, 1640s, 1670s, and 1710s. 71 The military/fiscal formats I have described each entailed a different level of administrative and documentary demand. Quantitatively, each format required more administators and more paper than the complex that preceded it.
The key variable would seem to be the degree to which the army was dependent on central supply, compensation, and control. Table 2 summarizes this hypothesis. The Muscovite cavalry army of 1500 was a quasi-local affair. Servitors raised their own military supplies, they were not centrally compensated in cash, and they relied on Moscow only occasionally for military coordination. fight. Certainly seventeenth-century courtiers worked more frequently with scribes and documents than their fifteenth century counterparts 72 , but their daily affairs were hardly dominated by offices and written instrument as were those of the chancellery officials. Despite these differences in degree we can identify certain general changes brought to all three groups by the coming of literate administration. 73 I will discuss four: 1) expansion; 2) stratification; 3) coordination; and 4) social identity.
Literate administration was instrumental in expanding the governing class as an effective social unit and thereby extending the circle of state control. In a premodern environment one of the keys to state power was the ability to mobilize and organize loyal personnel. 74 If we judge the early Muscovite state according to this criterion, it was obviously not a terribly effective organization. The duel structure of the army circa 1500 suggests this. As we saw, the cavalry host of Ivan III was essentially a mustering of the court in the immediate confines of Moscow. Courtiers could be easily mobilized because they were directly at hand. However for major campaigns, such as the attack on Novgorod in 1478, the courtier army momentarily expanded to include the military cohorts from regional towns and courts. Large mobilizations of the governing class were logistically difficult because the court had little knowledge of or control over distant servitors. In sum, under Ivan III the "state" -the mobilized force of the governing class -did not extend very far outside the walls of the Kremlin.
The advent of literate administration helped the court overcome the tyranny of distance and thereby expand the court's effective control over the governing class. 75 In the first half of the sixteenth century the court elite created Russia's first postal service linking the various areas of the expanding empire. 76 In the second half of the century, the regime of Ivan IV began to produce regular written audits of courtiers and regional forces. 77 With the aid of these two instruments, the empire and its army were knitted more completely than ever before. The extent of the court's knowledge of the governing class can be seen in the volume of personnel records that survive. Let us take as examples three species of service registers -one central, one chancellery, and one provincial. The boyar lists (boiarskie spiski) recorded the rank, service assignment, and physical condition of thousands of courtiers who served "on the Moscow list" (po moskovskomu spisku). 78 Beginning in the later sixteenth century they were drafted annually by the Moscow Desk The town military musters (desiatni) were all-purpose fiscal-military accounts that catalogued information regarding provincial servitors' monetary and land allotments, militarily viable dependents, horses, and weapons. The information in the musters was collected at annual reviews of local servitors and dispatched to the Moscow Desk of the Military Service
Chancellery. Twenty-one town military musters from the sixteenth century have survived, the oldest being one from Kashira in 1556. 83 In addition, there are references to over ninety sixteenth-century town military musters that have perished. 84 Three hundred and eighty town military musters come down to us from the seventeenth century, the latest from 1676. 85 These personnel registers, all created in connection with the military reforms and maintained by the Military Service Chancellery, were vehicles for and a representation of the extension of central control over the entire governing class. What had been a small collection of courtiers, scribes, and dependents in and around Moscow in the late fifteenth century had become a much larger group spreading over the entire empire by the mid-seventeenth.
Literate administration facilitated social stratification and differentiation among the court elite, chancellery personnel, and higher gentry. In addition to efficient mobilization of servitors, the power of early modern states depended on their ability to take exploit of the advantages of status and functional divisions. 86 To be sure, the Muscovite governing class was differentiated prior to the coming of chancellery administration, but all evidence indicates that the system of distinctions was little developed. The court elite (boiare) stood above the gentry (dvoriane and deti boiarskie), however neither group was vertically or horizontally divided in any thorough-going way. 87 The tiny grand princely scriptorium showed no sign of functional differentiation before the second half of the sixteenth century. 88 One reason for this relative simplicity was that innovation was not required: prior to the first encounter with Western-style forces in the third quarter of the sixteenth century the customary ways of organization were sufficient. Another reason had to do with the difficulty of elaborating a complex system of statuses and offices in the absence of sophisticated literate administration.
Certainly elaborate systems of social classification may exist without officers and documents to manage them, as may be seen in the case of kinship classifications. Nonetheless state-imposed systems of classification operate in a way that is greatly facilitated by external management and documentation. The rights and duties of a "mother" do not need to be systematically set out and the progression from "mother" to "grandmother" does not need to be authorized by anything Members of the early Muscovite governing class were, aside from a very few status and functional distinctions, of a piece. The court elite and higher gentry shared a common identity (elite), task (rule) and purpose (service), such that there was little need for any central coordination of activities by the scriptorium, which was commensurably small and unsophisticated. The grand prince and his retinue of boyars -the political as well as military elite of the realm -both directed and executed matters of collective importance (war, diplomacy, justice) collectively. 93 The solidarity of such homogeneous groups, Durkheim suggested, was mechanical -the very communality of life producing a fellow feeling that knit the group.
However advancing social complexity, produced in large measure by military reforms and facilitated by literate administration, brought increasing status and functional differentiation to the governing class. The once common culture of the tiny Moscow court was slowly divided and subdivided by fine distinctions of station and role. Though it would be a mistake to exaggerate the rapidity or extent of movement in this direction, even the limited differentiation we see in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made a new form of central coordination of roles and activities necessary.
According to Durkheim the solidarity of groups undergoing differentiation becomes increasingly less mechanical and more organic -the interaction of functionally complementary social units producing social cohesion. The agent of coordination within the governing class was obviously the chancellery system itself and the massive regulations it produced. As the government took on new tasks, new prikazy were created to manage them, and new legislation was promulgated to regulate and coordinate their activities. 94 In order to undertake even routine tasks the various chancelleries had to cooperate. Regular procedures to integrate administrative activities were created, as we see in the example of granting new salary entitlements (oklady). 95 The procedure was initiated by the servitor, who submitted a petition to a chancellery describing his service history and requesting a salary increase "as one's peers" (protiv moei brat'i), suggesting the existence of acknowledged norms. 96 The undersecretaries who processed the petitions checked the claims of the supplicant against official service registers and then listed precedents (primery) of the entitlements of servitors with profiles approximating that of the petitioner. If any of the necessary information was unavailable, a memo (pamiat') requesting the necessary data was issued to the relevant chancellery. 97 Finally, the entire matter was submitted for decision, an edict was handed down, and the results were transmitted to the chancelleries charged with disbursement, for example the Service Land Chancellery or the Fiscal Chancellery. What is abundantly clear from this example is that members of the governing class no longer interacted as members of a small, homogeneous retinue, but as functionaries with distinct, inter-dependent roles to play in an increasingly complex military-administrative enterprise.
The three changes we have surveyed combined to produce what may have been the most fundamental effect of the coming of literate administration -the beginning of the reorganization of social identity within the governing class.
Before the mid-sixteenth century, the identities of those in the governing class were formed in an environment characterized by locality, simplicity, and organic connection. 98 The circle of social intercourse was closely confined to court, clan, village, and parish. Few (though there are notable exceptions) had any significant regular contact with the world outside these spheres. Moreover, identities were simple in terms of the number of roles they comprised. Within the clan one might be father, brother, or son; within the court one might be a boyar, chief, or scribe. Finally, the self and social images servitors constructed out of these dense local relationships were shifting, many-sided, and embedded in the richness of daily life.
The coming of literate administration in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries altered the traditional matrix of identity-construction in the governing class. In short, locality, simplicity and personal connection was slowly encroached upon by centrality, complexity, and impersonality. 99 As the governing class became better integrated by the operation of included among the residents because, as he put it, his family had always served "on the Moscow list" (po moskovskomu spisku) and never "in provincial service" (po gorodu). 101 Further, the facets of identity multiplied as the state became more and more complex. Differentiation on the chancellery level was recapitulated on the level of the individual servitor by the division of roles and aspects of service. The relatively homogeneous deti boiarskie of the later fifteenth century were replaced in the mid seventeenth by a warriors with various military roles (dragun, reitar, etc.), ranks (vybornyi, dvorovyi, gorodovyi, etc.), land allotments (zemel'nyi oklad), and monetary allotments (denezhnyi oklad). Each of these characteristics informed the identity of the servitor, as may be seen in the complex self-identifications they used when addressing central authority. For example, in a petition of 1664 the serviceman Alesha Fedorov syn Pisarev identifies himself as captain ("rotmistr") of the new model cavalry ("reitarskii stroi") serving from the residents list ("zhiletskii spisok"). 102 Finally, though the facets of identity were many, they were stereotyped by the use of rigid, centrally imposed categories.
What had been flexible to intimate associates became fixed in the gaze of Moscow bureaucrats. To his family and friends
Pisarev was a member of their intimate community -son, father, neighbor. But his official self was a stereotype insofar as each of the characteristics he used to identify himself were general administrative categories. To the Moscow Desk, Pisarev was one of many captains of the new formation cavalry registered as a resident -a subject of imperial policy, not a concrete personality.
Conclusion
In the era of Ivan III the Muscovite dvor was a moderately-sized gathering of unlettered warriors who, together with a small group of scribes, managed a considerable principality in northeastern Rus'. A bit more than a century later the court was a much more complex entity comprising a well-stratified political elite, a system of functionally differentiated chancelleries, and a large network of gunpowder military forces. I have argued that behind this transformation were successive waves of military reform, waves which brought with them well-elaborated literate administration. I suggested that the coming of literate administration to the governing class -the court elite, chancellery personnel, and higher gentry -had four effects: integration on an imperial level; increased status and functional differentiation; a slow movement from mechanical to organic solidarity; and, finally, the transformation of patterns of social identity.
